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This paper provides a cradle-to-grave model for political union between two unequally 
endowed states. We introduce negotiated, contested, and time-consistent contested 
constitutions to address various classes of merger problems. Merger agreement is shown to 
be path dependent and, in some cases, time inconsistent. The possibility of contest constrains 
the set of mutually agreeable tax rates and provides stability to a constitution. Demographic 
heterogeneity constrains the set of mutually agreeable mergers. Rent extracted by 
technologically advanced province for transferring technology to the backward province in a 
union is shown to be increasing in complexity of technology but bounded from above. The 
model can also support the possibility of historical cycles of political geography. The main 
contribution of this paper is to highlight the role of technology gap and unequal distribution 
of resources in all the above cases. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Constitution is a commitment device which helps groups with conflicting interests within a 
state to commit to a scheme for distribution of power, which is underwritten by the actual 
distribution of means to power within the polity. A constitution can also be treated as a 
convention, a self-enforcing equilibrium under which everyone is better-off by conforming as 
long as all others do so.
2 Once the underlying distribution of means to power in the polity 
changes some players would be better-off by deviating from the behaviour prescribed by the 
convention and others would be obliged to follow the lead. A constitution is thus unlikely to 
outlive the socio-economic conditions under which it is a stable equilibrium and should thus 
provide for its own amendment. There are only a few occasions when a state might face 
constitutional quandaries. The first and foremost occasion comes when a state faces major 
political changes, e.g., regime change (abolition of monarchy, independence from foreign 
rule, and transition to/from communism/military dictatorship), territorial change (partition, 
union with another state), etc. The other occasion when even an otherwise stable state might 
face constitutional crisis is when the socio-economic structure of the polity changes, e.g., 
discovery of valuable mineral resources in some province, introduction of new technology 
benefiting only an ethnic and/or territorial fraction of the state, demographic change in favour 
of some group, etc. Unfavorable outcome in international wars might also lead to a 
constitutional crisis. In some countries constitutions have been helpful in handling such 
developments (e.g., Belgium, Canada, India, Spain, United Kingdom, etc) whereas in others 
constitutions have been part of the problem (e.g., Lebanon, Pakistan, etc). 
 
We are interested in the case involving political union between two independent states. 
Incidentally over the last two centuries disagreement over distribution of political power 
and/or resources torpedoed almost every non-coercive attempt to form a union out of 
sovereign states in the Third World. In this paper we will try to address the question of 
optimal constitutional design in the run-up to formation of political unions. In the process we 
will examine issues like path dependence, time inconsistency, and relation between 
constitution and contest. 
 
                                                 
2 A self-enforcing equilibrium ‘is called a convention only if one can imagine a different rule that would also be 
self-enforcing’ (Little 2002: 94-95).   5
Before proceeding it would be worthwhile to see how this paper relates to existing research. 
To be precise this paper relates to five lines of research. First of all it relates to the literature 
on game-theoretic modeling of constitutions. There is a very large literature focusing on 
economic implications, especially for fiscal policy, of constitutional design. See, for instance, 
Persson and Tabellini (2003). We are, however, only indirectly concerned with such issues. In 
spirit this paper relates to Grossman (2002) who models a self-enforcing constitution that 
provides an alternative to civil war in an established state. Our analysis, even though it applies 
to trans-national context, is in agreement with the central insight in Grossman (2002), namely, 
constitution can check conflicts if and only if expected gains from outright victory are not too 
large. Its subject matter is closer to Bordignon and Brusco (2001) who also present a cradle-
to-grave model for union between two states. However, our model differs in significant 
respects from their model, which is primarily concerned with optimal secession rule. They 
provide a two-period, two-state (both states identical ex ante) model of a union, which is 
expected to deliver trans-national public goods in future that cannot be produced within 
individual states. In contrast the driving force for union in our case is the need to share 
different kinds of technologies and matching surplus factor inputs.
3 
 
Secondly, it adds a new perspective to the issue of make-up and break-up of states. The model 
presented is fashioned so as to rule out merger due to conventional reasons, e.g., trade, 
economies of scale, etc, and focuses on the twin issues of technology transfer and resource 
mobility. To the best of our knowledge these issues have not been discussed in the relevant 
literature in the general framework presented here.
4 Thirdly, the paper relates to work on 
relationship between bargaining and contest. This paper differs from Anbarci et al (2002) and 
Skaperdas (2006) who explore how outcome varies as bargaining norm changes for a given 
type of contest. We are concerned with how outcome changes with the type of contest for a 
given bargaining norm. Fourthly, this paper contributes to the literature on impact of 
demographic heterogeneity on political processes. More specifically we show that ethnic and 
                                                 
3 Chen and Ordeshook (1994) also model constitutional secession rules but for a three province union. Inman and 
Rubinfeld (2008) model a constitution, which supports transition to democracy in South Africa. 
4 Alesina and Spolaore (2005) provide an extensive review of literature on make-up and break-up of states, 
which more or less begins with Friedman (1979). Noteworthy among models for specialized mergers is Chang 
(1995) who models a monetary union. In a paper close to our concern Yarborough and Yarborough (1994) argue 
that changes in state boundaries are required when cross-border contracts are not credible. But they do not 
provide a formal model. In a critical review, Young (2004) highlights the widely shared shortcomings of this 
literature. Also see Herbst (2000) in this regard.    6
economic heterogeneities severely constrain the set of mergers.
5 Finally our model is in 
agreement with one of the insights provided in Bulow and Rogoff (1989), namely, there are 
limits to sovereign debt recovery. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setting in two steps. 
First we define a constitutional agreement and identify its independent components and then 
introduce the socio-economic setting within which the independent components are 
determined. Section 3 introduces the benchmark model, with homogeneous population. In 
Section 4 we discuss the impact of demographic heterogeneity, savings, asymmetric 
information, etc on constitutional agreements. Section 5 concludes with a summary and a 
discussion on practical relevance of this model, as part of which we examine the experience of 
a few post-1945 cases of political unification. Unless otherwise specified please refer 




Consider two independent states, State A and State B, unequally endowed with human and 
material resources and production technologies specified in Section 2.2 (infra), exploring the 
possibility of merging to form a union. After merger erstwhile independent states become 
provinces of a union. Within the union each province as a whole would like to safeguard its 
interests. For this purpose they negotiate a constitution, which is the primary concern of this 
paper. Within a union unequally-endowed states can resolve to jointly manage technology and 
resources (labour and capital).
6 In case of technology this implies that the better technology is 
implemented in backward province whereas in case of resources this implies resource 
mobility, which eliminates resource scarcities and surpluses within the union. These policies 
enhance the economic product of the union. If both labour and capital are mobile then 
mobility of one of the two would be redundant in the process of matching excess demand and 
supply for factor inputs. So without loss of generality we can work with the assumption that 
only one of the resources, say labour, is mobile. Our conclusions remain unchanged if the 
possibility of mobility of labour and capital are interchanged. Interchanging labels of the two 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, McCormick and Owen (2004) on role of heterogeneity within the state and rebel camps in 
civil wars. Tsebelis (1988) deals with impact of intra-coalition heterogeneity on elections while Putnam (1988) 
explores the impact of intra-national heterogeneity on international agreements. 
6 For importance of resource, especially labour, mobility and technology transfer for political unions see case 
studies in Bookman (1993) and Horowitz (2000 [1985]).   7
resources in the model would suffice. In our model identity of mobile factor becomes 
important only in presence of ethnic heterogeneity (see Section 4.1, infra). 
 
2.1 Constitutional setting 
 
2.1.1 Typology of Unions 
 
Unions can be classified according to extent and type of merger that brings states together. A 
merger of states leading to a unitary state is followed by implementation of common tax rate 
throughout the post-merger state whereas a merger of states leading to a federal state is 
followed by implementation of different tax rates in different provinces of the post-merger 
state.
7 If states agree to jointly manage either resources or technology in the union then the 
merger is referred to as partial merger whereas in a full merger states agree to jointly manage 
both resources and  technology. Similarly, when states agree to jointly manage resources 
and/or  technology in a limited way within the union then the merger is referred to as 
incomplete merger whereas in a complete merger states agree to jointly manage resources 
and/or technology to the fullest extent. In the event of merger limited technology transfer 
implies that advanced state offers advanced technology for a fraction of capital in backward 
state whereas limited resource mobility is obvious. A partial merger could be incomplete or 
complete and similarly an incomplete merger could be partial or full. It should be clear that 
the size of resources at the disposal of the union depends on the nature of merger agreement. 
Obviously an incomplete, partial merger would result in lesser economic output compared to a 
complete, full merger. 
 
States can either choose to provide only for technology transfer (labour mobility) within the 
union under a TT-only (LM-only) merger. These are one issue-one step, i.e. partial, mergers. 
Alternatively, states can choose to provide for both technology transfer and labour mobility 
within the union under a full merger. Here states have three options: implement technology 
transfer and labour mobility simultaneously – TTLM merger, implement labour mobility after 
                                                 
7 Derivations for federal set-up are cumbersome due to different tax rates in provinces so we will focus on 
unitary unions in this paper. However, the results hold for an equivalent federal union as well after suitable 
transformation of the tax function. Details are available from author.   8
completing technology transfer – TTLM (TT) merger, and implement technology transfer 
after ensuring labour mobility – TTLM (LM) merger. The last two mergers can be interpreted 
as multi step-multi issue mergers addressing issues sequentially. TTLM merger is referred to 
as multi issue-one step merger. Given the large number of possibilities (see Figure 1) it is not 
difficult to see that the sequence of implementation of various components of a merger 
agreement will have a significant impact on the structure of union. 




We propose a constitution addressing the basic structure of a state, which can apply to a union 
of any number of states. It is only when we set about to find an optimal constitution that we 
need to restrict the number of states due to modelling constraints. Choice of a two state model, 
however, needs some justification in addition to the usual quip that ‘Three is a crowd in game 
theory’. There is indeed empirical support for choosing a two-state framework, namely, for 
the whole of 20
th Century we know of no case of negotiated merger involving more than two 
sovereign states.
8 With this justification we can work in a two-state framework. Our 
constitution consists of articles divided into two categories. Part I of the constitution contains 
the objective of union. Part II deals with instruments for implementing Part I. The articles of 
the constitution are defined below. 
 
1. Preamble (C0) states the objective of union (type and degree of merger) and the necessary 
conditions for its existence. 
() SR CC C n , , 0 θ = ;  CC CCn ∈         ( 1 )  
{} ) ( ), ( , , , 5 4 3 2 1 LM TTLM CC TT TTLM CC TTLM CC TT CC LM CC CC = = = = = =  
 
We will show later in the paper that each element of CC relates to an equilibrium in our 
model. Constitution helps in implementing one of them. We can therefore refer to the 
elements of CC as constitutional conventions. 
                                                 
8 The partially successful attempt to include Southern Yemen in an expanded United Arab Republic (a sovereign 
state formed after the merger of Egypt and Syria in 1958, which was dissolved in 1961) is the closest one gets to 
an attempt to achieve a non-coercive merger between three sovereign states. But the actual process of merger 
unfolded in two stages each involving two states at a time. After the dissolution of the Spanish American Empire 
at least half a dozen failed attempts were made in the 19
th Century to unite different groups of successor states.   9
 
Secession Rule (SR) specifies the conditions under which the union can be dissolved. 
Whenever SR specifies “Exit” the union dissolves peacefully else the secessionist province 
might be punished. 
SR: (g, t) → {(a, b)| a∈{Exit, Continue}, b∈{War, No War}}      (2) 
where g is additional economic product generated due to union and t is union tax rate 
 
The degree of merger is given by  ( ) T L θ θ θ , = .  ( ) 1 , 1 = θ  for complete, full mergers; (0,1) or 
(1,0) for complete, partial mergers;  ( ) b a, = θ  for incomplete, full mergers; (0,b) or (a,0) for 
incomplete, partial mergers; (0,0) for no merger, where  ( ) 1 , 0 , ∈ b a . Many countries have 
central and provincial lists of functions.  i θ = 1 could be interpreted as issue i being on central 
list. Similarly,  i θ = 0 could be interpreted as issue i being on provincial list because it implies 
that the union is not concerned with the issue, which is therefore left to respective provinces. 
Similarly  ∈ i θ (0, 1) could be interpreted as the issue being on a concurrent list. Another 
interpretation of θ  is as follows.  L θ  = 1 can be interpreted as individual right to free mobility 
within the union whereas  T θ  = 1 can be interpreted as obligation of state to ensure 
technological improvement for all units of capital in the backward province. 
 
2. (a) Seat Sharing Rule (C1) governs seat sharing in the union legislature. State i is assigned 
i λ  fraction of seats in the union legislature. 
()
} , {
1 , 1 , 0 | 1
B A i i







= ∈ = ∑λ λ λ       ( 3 )  
2. (b) Revenue Sharing Rule (C1a) governs the rate of taxation, t, and the share of State i in 
the tax revenue of union,  i β . 
() () []
} , {
max min, , 1 , 1 , 0 | , 1
B A i i







∈ = ∈ = ∑β β β    ( 4 )  
 
On the one hand tax rate cannot exceed a level, 
max t , beyond which individuals are denied 
subsistence. On the other hand the minimum tax rate, 
min t , has to be positive otherwise the 
state cannot function and will thus cease to exist. The cost of functioning could include 
provision of public goods. However, we are not concerned with the composition of basket of   10
public goods. The limits to taxation are revealed by nature and apply to all types of states. 
Later on we will show that an optimal secession rule specifies dissolution of unions that 
require taxation beyond these limits. Allowing different tax limits for different states will 
complicate the expressions without adding any new insights. Those not comfortable with 
min t  
and 
max t  can substitute them with numbers close to 0 and 1, respectively. 
 
3. Revision Rule (C2) governs rule-based revision of the initial agreement. 
() ( ) () {} Γ Ψ = + Γ Ψ = Z Z C 1 | 2         ( 5 )  
where  {} t SR CC Z i n , , , λ ∈ , Z(Γ′) is the value of Z in period Γ = Γ′, where Γ = 0, 1, 2. 
 
4. (a) Constitution Amendment  Rule  (C3) governs the procedure for amending the 
constitution. This rule is given by α , which specifies the quorum to effect a constitutional 
change, e.g., support of at least one more than 2/3
rd of the legislators is necessary if  3 / 2 = α . 
() {} 1 , 5 . 0 | 3 ∈ = α α C          ( 6 )  
4. (b) Inviolability Clause (C3a) declares if the original scope of merger (C0) is mutable or 
not.  INV∈ {0, 1}, where C0 is immutable if INV = 0. 
 
We end the introduction to constitution with a few remarks. First, INV is exogenously fixed. 
If the union is beneficial to one of the states, which is able to compensate the loser, or both 
states then INV = 0 does not bind. Else INV = 0 binds because the union cannot be 
restructured to generate additional surpluses, if possible. Second, a revision rule can only 
revise certain articles according to a pre-determined formula and is not self-referential while 
an amendment rule covers all articles of the constitution (unless constrained by INV) in the 
sense that a group of legislators fulfilling the requirement of quorum can change the entire 
constitution including the amendment rule itself. Third, we require the constitution 
amendment rule to meet the following criteria: Stability (should discourage frivolous 
amendments), Inclusiveness (should not dissuade a weaker state from joining the union), and 
Flexibility (should be as liberal as possible). Having defined the articles of constitution we can 
now define a constitution as C = (C0, C1, C1a, C2, C3, C3a). 
 
 
   11
2.1.3 Independent articles of constitution 
 
Merger negotiations can be decomposed into a number of parts dealing with different 
components of the constitution, which reminds of multi-issue bargaining.
9 However, we have 
to adopt a different approach
 because in our case the issues (articles), as we will show shortly, 
are not independent. In fact, a closer look at the various articles of constitution would suggest 
that rather than representing different pies these articles address different aspects of the same 
pie. We will isolate the independent articles of the constitution in two steps and argue that the 
order in which they are taken up does not require any bargaining over agenda. First of all note 
that even though in principle corresponding to each type of merger we can entertain the 
possibility of incomplete mergers, i.e.  T θ  and/or  1 < L θ , the following result shows that such 
mergers,  [ ) 1 , 0 , ∈ L T θ θ , are not possible.
10 
 
PROPOSITION 1 : (a) For any type of merger complete merger is strictly preferred to 
incomplete merger. (b) An incomplete merger of one type is never revealed preferred to a 
complete merger of another type. 
 
Secondly, we argue that a state’s share in union revenue is non-decreasing in its share of seats 
in union legislature and that a weaker state would be unwilling to join a union under a relaxed 
amendment rule.
11 The following result formalizes these points. 
 
LEMMA 1 : For a given equilibrium seat sharing rule,  i λ  (a)  i i λ β =  is the equilibrium 
revenue sharing rule and (b)  ( ) j i λ λ α , max =  is the equilibrium constitutional amendment rule 
satisfying the requirements of flexibility, stability, and inclusiveness. 
 
Later on we will also show that union tax rate depends on seat sharing rule (Lemma 7, infra). 
So Lemma 1 implies that an agreement on C1 also fixes C1a and C3. C3a is known to be 
exogenously fixed. We can now isolate the independent articles of a constitution.  
                                                 
9 See Fershtman (1990) for agenda in complete information bargaining games. 
10 It is well known that incomplete mergers are not uncommon, at least in South Asia. In India peripheral 
provinces, which are substantially different from the “mainstream” in terms of ethnic identity, were incorporated 
under incomplete and/or partial merger arrangements. In our model incomplete mergers could arise if we 
introduce demographic heterogeneity (see Section 4.1, infra). 
11 In a number of cases Third World minorities were promised equal treatment at the time of independence but 
later on the majorities easily amended the respective constitutions to the disadvantage of the former.   12
 
LEMMA 2: CCn and C1 are the only independent (sub-) articles in Part I and Part II of the 
constitution, respectively. 
 
Note that C1 itself depends on CCn so that ultimately the entire constitution can be reduced to 
CCn, which is not surprising as the latter is an expression of the objective of merger. But it is 
through C1, not directly, that CCn determines the rest of the constitution (C1a, C2, and C3). 
(It is not for nothing that seat sharing is the most contentious issue in merger negotiations.) 
Further it is intuitively obvious that bargaining on agenda is not required since in any case 
preamble (CCn) has to be fixed before C1. 
 
2.2 Material setting 
 
2.2.1 Human resources and material resources 
 
Our world consists of two states. Li and Ki, respectively, are the shares of labour and capital 
held by state i.
12 Capital (labour) constrained state’s share in aggregate or worldwide capital 
(labour) falls short of its share in aggregate labour (capital). It should not be difficult to see 
that between a pair of states one would be capital constrained while the other would be labour 
constrained. In other words the upper limit of availability of one of the factors is fixed in each 
state due to skewed distribution of resources. Relative distribution of resources across states is 
assumed to be time invariant. Within each state assume equal division of capital and labour 
resources, available in the state, among all individuals, who are endowed with identical 
preferences. Depending on merger agreement labour might be mobile. Once labour mobility is 
allowed it leads to instantaneous and optimal reallocation of labour between states. As pointed 
out above all our results hold if capital or both labour and capital are mobile instead of 
labour (see Section 2.0, supra). We assume that resource mobility does not lead to permanent 
redistribution of resources so that labour and capital continue to belong to the state of origin 
irrespective of where they are employed. In Section 4.4 we discuss a plausible rationale for 
this assumption. 
                                                 
12 Normalization used in the paper, namely, KA + KB = 1 and LA + LB = 1 is without loss of generality. One could 




Output is governed by the following production function, which applies to both the states: 
( ) i K i L i i K q L q X Q , min = , where  { } B A X i , ∈       ( 7 )  
 
For sake of simplicity assume  1 = = K L q q  so that one unit each of labour and capital are 
required to produce X units of output.
13 A (B) represents productivity of technology in State A 
(B). The state that is initially relatively technologically advanced is also referred to as 
advanced state while the other is referred to as backward. The same good is produced in both 
states and its price is normalized to unity.
14 We assume that individuals in both states have 
identical subsistence requirements, which can be fulfilled using the backward technology even 
at the maximum rate of taxation, 
max t . 
 
Technologies differ in terms of time (T*) required to transfer them to a new user. 
Technologies requiring infinite time to transfer ( ∞ → * T ) are referred to as Type I 
technologies while the remainder are referred to as Type II technologies. The type of 
technology is denoted by  {} II I, ∈ γ .  T* is in fact a proxy for complexity of technology. 
Transfer of Type I technology involves only the transfer of use rights while in case of Type II 
technology transfer implies that after a gestation period the ability of new user to use the 
technology is no longer dependent on the continued support of the original owner. Note that in 
case of Type I technologies TTLM (TT) merger is not possible because in such a merger LM 
has to be implemented after completion of technology transfer, which never happens with this 
type of technology. So a TTLM (TT) merger with Type I technology is effectively a TT 
merger. Also note that we assume that productivity in backward province increases to the 
maximum possible level as soon as agreement for technology transfer takes place even though 
assimilation/transfer of technology, if at all possible (as in case of Type II technology), takes 
                                                 
13 To use the normalization KA + KB = K′, etc instead of KA + KB = 1, etc we need to assume K′qK = L′qL = 1. 
14 Without loss of generality we can interpret output as a basket of goods and services with the only restriction 
that the basket be same across states. We are not concerned with the composition of the basket. Further note that 
our setting differs from a Heckscher-Ohlin economy. In our case two factors are used to produce one output and 
states are endowed with different technologies and factors can be mobile.   14
place over a longer period. The alternate assumption that productivity increases gradually over 
time only adds complexity to the analysis without affecting any of our results. 
 
2.2.3 Division of economic product 
 
Given production function (Eqn 7 with qL = qK = 1) labour and capital receive equal returns. 
In case of excess availability of an input in state i, say labour, some units () i i K L −  are left 
completely unutilised or all units of that input are equally under-utilized, i.e. each unit of 
labour works at  i i L K  fraction of its potential. However, this distinction does not matter for 
us because we assume that within an independent state or province returns to a factor are 
divided equally among all the owners. More specifically we do not differentiate between 
owners of employed and unemployed resources.
15 The share of product accruing to capital is 
divided equally among all capital holders and that accruing to labour is divided equally among 
all labour owners. So, within a state all individuals, who happen to own equal capital and 
labour by assumption, receive equal shares from the economic product and are thus equally 
well-off. 
 
State taxes individuals uniformly and spends the entire revenue on public goods. Pre-merger 




i t t , , but within a unitary union tax rate is 
same across provinces, 
union union
i t t = . Pre-merger tax rate is immaterial since everything is 
spent within the same political entity. However, post-merger tax rate has implications for 
redistribution of income across provinces. Note three very important points here. One, we 
assume that there is no deadweight loss associated with inter-province tax-based transfers. 
However, all our results can be easily derived even in case of non-zero deadweight losses, i.e. 
for every unit of transfer from a province only a fraction reaches the recipient province. Two, 
our results remain unaffected if incomes from labour and capital resources are taxed 
differently. Three, for simplicity we assume that income generated from employment of 
resources outside the province of origin is taxed in the home province. Even though the 
arithmetic becomes complicated the substance of this paper remains unchanged if instead we 
                                                 
15 If agents are uncertain about whose resources are going to be left unused then organization into a cooperative 
serves as unemployment insurance.   15
provide for taxation of income generated by mobile resources in the province of employment 




Since each state/province has individuals endowed with identical preferences and material 
resources we can treat a state/province as an internally undifferentiated monolith. So within an 
independent state/province aggregate and individual optimization problems are equivalent. In 
absence of union independent states are the players otherwise provinces of the union are the 
players. Policy-makers of state/representatives of provinces in union legislature are chosen at 
random from among their respective populations. Alternatively, all individuals within a 
state/province contribute equal time to the task of policy making, which can be interpreted as 
part of the basket of goods and services produced in the concerned state. In either case we do 
not face principal-agent problem, which also rules out merger driven by empire builders. 




Economic and political (share of seats in legislature) components of pay-off to a state are 
additive. The pay-off function is given by: 










i Q t P t Q E U , , , λ + = ; s∈{independence, union}     (8) 
 
s
i Q  and 
s
i λ  are, respectively, state i’s economic product and share in legislature. 
ce independen
i




union Q Q . Independent states enjoy full control over 
levying and utilization of taxes due to complete control over legislature, i.e.  1 =
t independen
i λ , but 
the size of state resources is smaller. The share of provinces in union legislature is necessarily 
limited, 1 < = i
on uni
i λ λ , but the size of state resources is larger than before so that there is a 
possibility of trade-off between the two components of pay-off. Political pay-off to a province 
in a union from share of seats in union legislature is equivalent to its share in union taxes and   16
is given by  ()
union union




i λ β =  by virtue of Lemma 1 and ()
union tQ  is the total 
tax revenue of union. Economic component of pay-off consists of economic product net of 
taxation, i.e.  ( )
union union
i t Q − 1 . The pay-off functions for a state under different conditions are 
provided below. 
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2.2.6 Post-merger intra-union arrangement 
 
If labour from one province migrates to the province where output is labour constrained the 
migrants send back remittances proportionate to their labour input while the capital rich 
province gets additional income due to employment of hitherto unutilized capital. Migrant 
labour is not discriminated against and is paid as much as the native labour. Relaxing this 
assumption affects the details but not the substance of the paper. It is trivial to establish that 
whenever free labour mobility is agreed upon migration takes place only from labour surplus 
to labour constrained province and that the upper limit to migration is provided by the fraction 
of surplus labour (which can be loosely referred to as unemployment rate) in labour surplus 
province. This holds true since labour force and technology are not differentiated by skill 
levels in our model. If technology transfer has been agreed upon then after merger better 
technology is implemented in the backward province. Recall that we do not allow permanent 
resource migration, which would imply irreversible resource transfer and consequent loss of 
bargaining power of the “donor” state/province. Depending on initial material and 
technological endowments, i.e. gross economic product, each province, erstwhile state, 
exercises some control over policy making in the union, which is denoted by  i λ .  i λ  might not 
coincide with population/resource shares in the union. 
 
Having described at length the political (constitution) and the economic primitives of the 
model we can now proceed to examine the actual process of merger. But before that few 
words on what happens in the event of lack of consensus. 
   17
2.2.7 Contest 
 
In case the two sides fail to settle issues via negotiation they choose between contest and 
status quo. The latter is obvious. For the former we assume the following contest success 
function after Skaperdas (1996): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ∑ ∈ =
I j j i j i i e f e f e e p ,;   ( )
r
i i e e f ⋅ =ν , where  0 ≥ r  and  0 > v    (11) 
 
where  i p is the probability state i emerges successful in a contest with state j,  0 ≥ r  measures 
the effectiveness of additional effort in a contest, and  i e denotes the resources state i can 
mobilize for a contest. In the event of contest states incur a fixed cost Ci irrespective of the 
outcome.
16 F captures the advantages of contest strategy. In case state i strikes first Fi > 0, 
which brings down the cost of contest to state i. Fi = 0 when both attack simultaneously. Also 
Fi > 0⇒, Fj < 0, i.e. when state i strikes first then state j incurs additional costs for being 
defensive, which in other words adds to the cost of contest incurred by state j. A non-zero first 
strike advantage ensures contest is never a strictly dominated strategy. Assume |Fi| < Ci holds 
for both states. In our model the process of negotiation is assumed to be costless relative to 
contest. There are two categories/technologies of contest,  { } II I, ∈ κ . 
1.  Category I: Winner extracts entire additional economic production possible due to a 
merger, which leaves the loser with its No Merger economic product. 
2.  Category II: Winner implements most favourable tax rate within the set of mutually 
agreeable bargaining solutions for constitutional union. (This type of contest can also 
be interpreted as an electoral contest over tax policy.) 
 
Cost of contest and first strike advantage increase with the degree of appropriation involved. 
Under an interesting possibility ignored here a state could indulge in destruction or permanent 
appropriation of a counterpart’s productive resource base to increase its bargaining power as 
in Skaperdas (2006). This is tantamount to assuming that the cost of permanent appropriation 
of resources is prohibitive, i.e.  ( ) ( ) i i i K L B A t permanent C , min , max ) (
max ⋅ ⋅ > . It is indeed 
                                                 
16 We ignore the possibility that the cost of contest to a state could be endogenous insofar as it depends on 
economic conditions. Higher productivity means more efficient war making, which saves cost but it also means 
higher opportunity cost. Higher economic product likewise means that cost of contest as a fraction of whole 
economy might be smaller but in absolute terms it might be higher compared to a state with lesser economic 
output. Another source of endogeneity could result from loss of productive assets in a contest.   18
very easy to overlook the fact that without savings or reasonably large wealth endowment 
costly wars cannot be financed (for more on savings see Section 4.3, infra).
17 Alternatively, 
the presumption could be that the present distribution of resources has been arrived at after all 




Agreement on independent articles, namely, type of merger (CCn) and seat sharing rule (λ ), 
is the primary concern of negotiation in the run-up to merger. The ultimate objective of the 
negotiation is not to actually divide the unionwide economic product. Rather the intention is 
to use the shares obtained from a hypothetical partition of the unionwide economic product 
generated by a given type of merger to arrive at λ , the share of seats in the union legislature, 
which in turn determines union tax revenue sharing. λ  derived below have to be interpreted 
in this spirit. Ideally a full and complete merger leading to simultaneous technology transfer 
and labour mobility (TTLM) should be the preferred outcome under which total product is 
maximized. However, the two sides can choose from among several different kinds of 
complete mergers, including both partial and full types. Recall that by virtue of Proposition 1 
incomplete mergers are never contracted. Given the large number of ways of achieving 
merger we will briefly discuss the issue of choice of type of merger and conflict resolution 
technology and then introduce the actual negotiation process. A plausible solution could be 
that we allow nature to choose the set of desirable mergers for each state, which is made 
known to both states.
18 
 
Let  T(i)  denote the set of desirable types of merger chosen by nature for State i.  At the 
beginning of period Γ= 0 nature chooses N = (Ki, Li, A, B, γ , κ , T(i), T(j), INV), i.e. material 
endowments, type of technology and technological gap, type of contest, set of desirable 
mergers, and whether preamble is mutable or not. T(i)∩T(j) is the set of mutually agreeable 
merger types. States decide the type of merger to be negotiated through a normal form game 
                                                 
17 Colomer (2007: 35) draws attention to the fact that some of the 20
th Century wars cost more than 100% GDP 
to the participants. Incidentally all these wars involved efforts to change existing borders. In other words it is 
easier to snatch part of current output than to appropriate productive resources permanently. 
18 Earlier we saw that TTLM (TT) mergers are not possible with Type I technologies (see Section 2.2.2, supra). 
Hence by fixing type of technology nature can constrain the set of desirable mergers. Historical experience can 
also play the role of nature. A state that had a bad experience with labour mobility in past ignores mergers 
involving labour mobility thereafter. However, to account for such possibilities we need to introduce incomplete 
information and history (prior to the onset of present round of merger negotiations) into the model. Alternatively, 
we can constrain the set of desirable mergers by introducing demographic heterogeneity as in Section 4.1 (infra).   19
in which each state has |T(i)∩T(j)| strategies. If |T(i)∩T(j)| = 1 then the outcome is unique else 
the normal form game resembles a pure coordination game and has |T(i)∩T(j)|>1 pure 
strategy Nash equilibria and no mixed strategy equilibria. States can choose a conflict 
resolution technology from CRT = {status quo, contest, negotiate} to resolve the conflict. 
 
3.1 Game of Merger, M 
 
We model the game of merger with rational players and complete information using an 
alternating offers bargaining model with endogenous inside options and contest as outside 
option. Pay-off functions, rationality of each player, and all relevant parameters of the model 
are common knowledge. In such a model if outside option of both players is dominated by 
outcome generated by bargaining outcome based on inside option then outside option has no 
impact on solution of the problem. If, however, outside option dominates the bargaining 
outcome for even one player it dictates the solution to the game as if inside options were not 
there (Muthoo 1999: Section 6.4). In other words we have two separable regimes, under the 
first bargaining dominates (N). In the second contest dictates the solution (CN). In the latter 
there are two structurally identical sub-cases depending on whether contest dominates 
negotiation for state i or j. We can therefore model the problem dichotomously. 
 
3.1.1 Negotiation Game, N 
 
We use the alternating offers bargaining model with endogenous inside options
19 to model the 
process of bargaining. The ‘pie’ under negotiation is the present discounted value of the total 




Union ∑ = = ) ( , where n signifies type of 
merger. In each period of disagreement the inside options of the states are determined 
endogenously. Endogeneity results from the fact that the inside options depend on the choice 
made by players within the process of bargaining through a non-cooperative game. Gains 
from merger are the present discounted values of difference between the total economic 
product of the union and the sum of inside options. We assume that both players have 
identical discount rates () r r r B A = = , so their evaluations of gains from a given type of merger 
                                                 
19 Busch and Wen (1995) extend Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating offers model to account for endogenous inside 
options. We follow the slightly modified version of their model presented in Muthoo (1999).   20
are identical. Discount factors () B A δ δ ≠ , applicable to bargaining, differ due to different 
response times,  B A Δ ≠ Δ .  i Δ  has two interpretations. One, it is the time,  ii Δ , which state i 
takes to make an offer after rejecting an offer of state j. Two, it is the time,  ij Δ , after which 
state j allows state i to make a counter-offer after the latter rejects an offer of the former. 
Ideally  ( ) ij ii i Δ Δ = Δ , max . We will assume  ij ii Δ < Δ  so that  ij i Δ = Δ . 
 
Disagreement game,  () n Θ  
 
The actions of players when in disagreement in the process of negotiation are captured by a 
disagreement game, which is represented by a simultaneous move, one-shot game of complete 
information,  () { } { } [] {} B A i i i n S U n , ) ( , ∈ = Θ .  {}( ) ℜ → Π ∈ n S U i B A i i , :  and  ( ) n Si  is set of strategies 
available to state i, identical for both states, in the event of disagreement in the course of 
negotiation for n-type merger.  ( ) n Θ ˆ  is the set of Nash equilibria of  ( ) n Θ . In the event of 
disagreement the two sides choose actions in the disagreement game according to which they 
enjoy interim benefits till they reconvene for negotiations. 
 
In one issue-one step (partial) mergers, TT or LM, the two sides choose to remain independent 
in case of disagreement over merger. In case of multi issue-multi step mergers, TTLM (LM) 
or TTLM (TT), in the event of disagreement in each step the two sides have only one option. 
If there is a disagreement during the first step the two sides can only choose not to merge 
(NM) whereas if there is a disagreement in latter steps the two sides can only choose not to 
proceed with further unification (SQ). In other words multi-step mergers are structurally akin 
to one issue-one step mergers. In multi issue-one step mergers, TTLM, in the event of 
disagreement over full, complete merger the two sides can choose from among three different 
options – no merger (NM), merger with only technology transfer (TT), and merger with only 
labour mobility (LM). TTLM merger cannot be reduced to a one issue-one step merger or a 
combination of two such mergers. 
 
Si(n) ={} NM  in case of one issue-one step mergers whereas in case of multi issue-one step 
mergers Si(n) ={} TT LM NM , , . The case involving |Si(n)| = 1 is trivial. It is to cases involving 
|Si(n)| > 1 that we turn next. Disagreement game with multiple strategies, as in case of TTLM   21
mergers, can be depicted using a normal form game shown in Figure 2. For description of 
pay-offs see Appendix II. 
Figure 2 about here 
 
A number of cases can be obtained for interaction of two states depending on different 
combinations of technology and resource distribution. Table 1 summarizes the entire range of 
possibilities. The disagreement game shown in Figure 2 is provided only as an aid to 
understanding. Otherwise the following analysis relates to the general case introduced in 
Section 2.2 (supra). 




With rational players and complete information alternating offers bargaining with endogenous 
inside options yields an agreement in the initial period with |Θ ˆ | stationary subgame perfect 
equilibria (SSPE), where |Θ ˆ | is the number of Nash equilibria of Θ  (Muthoo 1999). For each 
essentially one issue-one step merger there is one SSPE corresponding to one Nash 
equilibrium of Θ , namely, (NM, NM). In case of multi issue-one step merger there are four 
SSPEs corresponding to the four Nash equilibria of Θ , namely, (LM, LM), (TT, TT), (NM, 
TT) and (NM, NM). The last two equilibria are not only pay-off equivalent but also identical 
in terms of outcome, namely, complete independence in absence of agreement on merger. 
Therefore, we consider only (LM, LM), (TT, TT), and (NM, NM) and the corresponding sub-
types of merger are referred to as TTLM-LM, TTLM-TT, and TTLM-NM. The following 
result provides the equilibrium seat sharing rule. The proof follows in straightforward manner 
from a slight modification of similar results available in literature (Busch and Wen 1995, 
Muthoo 1999) for the case ( ) j i r r ≠  to our case where ( ) r r r j i = =  and ( ) j i Δ ≠ Δ . 
 
LEMMA 3: In the limit as  0 → Δi  and  0 → Δ j  (but  j i Δ ≠ Δ ) the unique SSPE seat sharing 
rule for states  {}   , , B A j i ∈  is given by  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) n n m n n m i i Θ − Θ | , 1 , | , λ λ , where  () n m di , i s  
the pay-off accruing to State i as inside option in the mth Nash equilibrium of  () n Θ , the 
disagreement game for n-type merger,  i η is bargaining power of State i, and  () n m g ,  is the   22
rate of gain from n-type merger when strategies corresponding to the mth Nash equilibrium of 
() n Θ  are chosen in the event of disagreement. 
















⎛ + = Θ
, ,
| , η λ       (12) 
()()() ( ) n m d n m d CC Q n m g j i n , , , − − =  
( ) j i j i Δ + Δ Δ = η  
{} 3   , 2   , 1 ∈ n ,  () { } | ˆ | ...   , 1 n m Θ ∈  and  j i ≠  
 
Note a few things here. One, since we are interested in structurally independent types of 
mergers we restrict n such that n ∈ {1, 2, 3} in Eqn 1. Two, using the limiting solution of the 
negotiation model saves us from making unreasonable assumption about the identity of the 
first mover in the negotiation game. Three,  ( ) ( ) n n m i Θ | , λ  is equivalent to the asymmetric 
Nash bargaining solution to our problem. Four, our model does not have mixed strategy 
SSPEs or non-Markov perfect equilibria.
20 Four, we can arrive at (12) using a more rigorous 
model in which state i has capacity to cause additional delay of  Δ − Δi  before the next round of 
bargaining whenever its offer is rejected, where 
jj ii Δ = Δ = Δ . We can show that in a model with 
inside options given that state j delays whenever state i’s offer is rejected state i also resorts to 
delay tactics if and only if certain conditions are fulfilled and that these conditions necessarily 
hold for both states in the limiting case.
 21 Finally, we can say that  i Δ , the time for which state 
i is forced to wait before making its offer after rejecting state j’s offer, is non-decreasing in the 
resources state j  can generate from inside option. Since, the only difference between our 
players is their resource and technological endowments, i.e. economic product, relative 
bargaining power has to depend on relative economic product. We assume a linear 
dependence between the inside option of state i and the delay state i can cause before the next 
round of bargaining whenever state j rejects its offer. 
j i ≠ ∀   () () m n d a m n i j , , ⋅ = Δ        ( 1 3 )  
 
so that relative bargaining power of state i is given by 
                                                 
20 The model has infinite Markov perfect equilibria, many of them pay-off equivalent, in which agreement is 
reached in the initial period. Markov SPEs do not add much to our understanding of the present problem other 
than drawing attention to the fact that there is no limit to variation in equilibrium power sharing agreements. 
21 See Avery and Zemsky (1994) and Muthoo (1999) for bargaining with delays.   23
() ( )














= η , where  1 = ∑i i η  and  () 1 , 0 ∈ i η    (14) 
 
The next result, which relates seat sharing and relative bargaining power, follows directly 
from (12) – (14). 
 




Now we will address the issue of omission of tax adjustments in Θ . Pay-offs in Θ  need to be 
adjusted for tax transfers within the ad hoc union whenever disagreement game supports the 
possibility of partial mergers, |Si(n)| > 1. This is required only in case of multi issue-one step 
TTLM mergers so we will confine ourselves to disagreement games of the type shown in 
Figure 2. Using (8) – (10) we can arrive at tax adjusted pay-offs. The corresponding tax 
adjusted disagreement game is denoted by  ' Θ . The next result establishes the equivalence of 
' Θ  (Figure 3) and a reduced form disagreement game,  ' ' Θ  (Figure 4). 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
LEMMA 5:  () 1 , 0 ∈ ∀ t   ' Θ , the tax adjusted disagreement game, is strategically equivalent to 
' ' Θ , the reduced form disagreement game so that  ' ' ˆ ' ˆ Θ = Θ . 
 
COROLLARY 1:  ) , ( \ ˆ ' ' ˆ ' ˆ TT NM Θ = Θ = Θ , where (NM, TT) is equivalent to (NM, NM) in terms 
of merger outcome, namely, no merger, as well as pay-offs. 
 
The following result establishes equivalence between equilibrium seat sharing determined 
using tax adjusted and unadjusted disagreement games. It follows from Lemma 4 and 5 and 
Corollary 1. 
 
LEMMA 6:  () ( ) ( ) Θ = Θ = Θ | , ' ' | , ' | , n m n m n m i i i λ λ λ   t ∀ .   24
 
The next result formalizes the idea that the net recipient of transfers within the union would 
prefer higher union tax rate and vice versa. 
 
LEMMA 7: Unequally endowed states have opposed preferences over union tax rate with state 












i x g λ , where 
n
i E  
represents economic product of state i after n-type merger, 
n
i x  represents additional product 




n x g  represents the 
corresponding total gain from merger. 
 
3.1.2 Contested Negotiations, CN 
 
As suggested above states can use one of the following CRTs, namely, status quo, contest, 
and negotiate, to resolve the conflict. We have already derived results for negotiations without 
contests while the case involving status quo as a strategy is trivial. In fact, it was subsumed as 
a disagreement strategy, namely, No Merger, within the negotiation game. Since contest 
cannot be subsumed as an inside option we introduce it as an outside option in the negotiation 
game.
22 We assume that the winner of the contest imposes its favourite solution, which varies 
with the category of contest under consideration.  i SQ  denotes the returns from maintaining 
status quo. The expressions for total gains from merger and returns to state i from negotiations 
and contest, respectively, are given below where we omit the superscript (n) for type of 
merger and assume without loss of generality that  i i x g > λ . Note that g captures the overall 
hike in economic output due to a given type of a merger, which is different from what 
individual provinces gain from merger. 
 
Gains from merger:  j i x x g + =          ( 1 5 )  
Negotiation:  () ( ) ( ) i i i j i i i i x g t E E E t E t U − + = + + − = λ λ 1      (16) 
Contest (Type I):  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i j i i
I
i F C SQ g p F C SQ p x E p R − − + = − − − + + = 1  (17) 
Contest (Type II):  ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i
II
i F C t U p t U p R − − − + =
min max ) 1 (      (18) 
                                                 
22 See Muthoo (1999) for difference between inside and outside options.   25
     Or  ( ) ( ) i i i i i
II
i F C x g E R − − − + = λ ρ  
 
where 
min max ) 1 ( t p t p i i − + = ρ ( )
max min,t t ∈  and use is made of Lemma 7 following which we 
can say that if  i i x g > λ  then state i prefers 
max t and state j prefers 
min t . In the following result 
we show the limits to possibility of contest. In the proof of this proposition we specify 
conditions under which different conflict resolution strategies dominate. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: For a given type of merger contest cannot dominate negotiate for both states 
simultaneously. 
 
The following is immediately apparent from the proof of Proposition 2. 
 
COROLLARY 2: Set of feasible bargains is never empty in case of Category II contests, which 
essentially involve contests to relocate along the bargaining frontier. 
 
In the next proposition we identify the set of CRTs, seat sharing rule, and tax rate under 
different conditions. Recall that T(i) is the set of desirable types of merger chosen by nature 
for State i and note the following tie-breaking property. 
 
PROPERTY  1: (a) When indifferent between independence and union a state chooses the 
former. (b) When indifferent between contest and negotiation a state chooses the latter. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Given Property 1 and |Fi| < Ci 
1.  Sovereign Peace: If |T(l) | = 0,  { } j i l , ∈ , in equilibrium there is no conflict, and hence no 
contest, between states. Conflict resolution technology is given by CRT = {status quo}. 
The states remain independent and  1 =
t independen
i λ . States are free to choose tax rates, 
∈ t [
max min,t t ]. 
2.  Negotiated/Contested Peace: If |T(i)  ∩T(j)|  1 ≥  in equilibrium there is conflict between 
the states. For sufficiently large gains and/or small cost of contest status quo is strictly 
dominated and CRT = {contest, negotiate}. n-type merger takes place in the initial period, 
where CCn ∈T(i)∩T(j).   26
a.  Negotiated Constitutional Union:  negotiate dominates contest for both states. 
() () n m i i ' |
* * Θ = λ λ  is given by Lemma 6. Post-merger tax rate is given by 
a.  Type I Contest:  ( ) ( ) []
max min
* * , , * t t
x g
F C x g p
x g
F C x g p
t
i i
j j i i
i i
















b.  Type II Contest:  []
max min




























b.  Contested Constitutional Union: negotiate dominates contest for only one of the states, 









I n m κ λ , ' |
* , where  i R  is given by (17). Post-merger tax rate is 
given by  * t  = 
max t  if  i i x g >
* λ  else  * t  = 
min t . 
3.  Mutual War: If |T(i)∩T(j)| = 0 and |T(l)| ≠ 0 for at least one state there is conflict between 
the states. CRT = {status quo, contest} iff cost of contest is sufficiently high else CRT = 
{contest}. Contest takes place in every period with success being determined by contest 
success function, Eqn (11). 
 
In words whenever a merger is mutually desirable and gains are modest relative to costs of 
contest states opt for the purely negotiated solution.
23 Otherwise state for which contest is the 
dominant conflict resolution strategy dictates the solution. Note that in many cases the exact 
value of tax rate remains indeterminate even after introducing the possibility of contest. The 
following corollary should be apparent from Proposition 3. 
 
COROLLARY 3: (a) The set of all possible pure strategy equilibria of Game of Merger, M, 
consists of 1+ g ˆ + () ∑∑ Θ
nm m n, ' ' ˆ  equilibria corresponding to different combinations of 
merger types and contest categories, where g ˆ  is the set of mergers for which negotiate 
dominates contest for only one of the states and gains from merger are not identical. n and m 
refer to the type of merger and disagreement strategy, respectively. (b) The equilibria of Game 
                                                 
23 An important point bears noting here. Assume for simplicity that quantity of public goods varies directly with 
total tax collection. What if the people of the province, which is a net donor, demand that quantity of public 
goods in their province should not fall below pre-merger level? This would enter the merger negotiation as an 
exogeneous constraint on seat sharing rule, which in turn governs revenue sharing, but one that does not affect 
the marginal calculus. Adding this constraint to Proposition 3 would only complicate expressions without 
providing any new insight. By the way this constraint is not as restrictive as it seems at first. The reason being 
that the output increases after merger so that even after transfers to other province there are additional resources 
at the disposal of the province. Furthermore whether migrant labour force enjoys public goods in province of 
employment or not does not affect the equilibria in Proposition 3.   27
of Merger, M, are path dependent,  ( ) ( ) n m i ' | Θ λ  = f(P), where P = (n, ) (n m ) is the path of 
merger. 
 
Path of merger refers to the choice of type of merger and the ad hoc arrangement, if any, 
during the period of disagreement during negotiation for the merger. Different values of 
() n m i , λ  relate to different merger types. The shares of the states in the union vary with type 
of equilibria even though the type of merger might be same. In other words we have shown 
that for the same initial distribution of resources and technology gap states end up with 
different shares in a union depending on the steps followed to implement merger, i.e. path of 




Consider the following values for endowment parameters in the example discussed in 
Appendix II. Technology: A = 2B = 2, Resources: KA = 0.70, KB = 0.30, LA = 0.80, and LB = 
0.20. In Table 2 we provide share of state B in union legislature for above endowment 
parameters and different types of mergers. Irrespective of the route chosen backward state’s 
share in policy-making is far from the ideal distribution of power based on share in economic 
product of the union. So why does a backward state choose to merge? One reason why 
backward state might agree for such a merger is that complete, full merger (TTLM), in the 
present example, leads to 150 % hike in its absolute product whereas the corresponding figure 
for State A is merely 7.14 %. In this example the advanced state is driven towards merger by 
greater share of an expanded tax base whereas higher income drives the backward state to 
merge. Disproportionate share gained by advanced state, which entitles it to transfer some of 
state B’s newly generated wealth to its regions via taxation, can be interpreted as the price for 
technology transfer paid by the backward state. 
Table 2 about here 
 
3.1.3 Time Inconsistency 
 
Time inconsistency in behaviour refers to mismatch between preferred ex post and optimal ex 
ante strategies. In the next result we show the time inconsistency of constitutional equilibria   28
involving Type II technology, which can be transferred over a finite time. The intuition 
behind the result is that once technology transfer is over the erstwhile backward state would 
seek revision of existing arrangement, something not accounted for in Proposition 3. Time 
inconsistency influences outcomes by affecting the disagreement game. For instance, in case 
of TTLM mergers the number of possible routes to merger and associated SSPEs are reduced 
since TT is no longer a strategy in the redefined disagreement game after technology transfer. 
 
PROPOSITION 4: If a merger involves technology transfer then irrespective of the type of 
merger the equilibria supported by Proposition 3 are time consistent iff merger involves Type 
I technology. 
 
This result implies that whenever Type II technology is involved in merger initial agreement 
has to be revised at T* because the initial arrangement is no longer sub-game perfect in all 
periods. In this case only an arrangement with a time-consistent revision and secession rule 
can be sub-game perfect. Following Proposition 4 it is easy to see that for Type I technology 
revision and secession rules are trivial. Further irrespective of type of technology deriving the 
equilibrium revenue sharing, 
* *
i i λ β = , and amendment,  ( )
* *, max * j i λ λ α = , rules from seat 
sharing rule, 
* λ , is straightforward. We, therefore, turn our attention to revision and secession 
rules, which brings us face to face with the problem of time inconsistency in merger 
agreements. As noted above only Type II technologies, which can be transferred over a finite 
period, are associated with time inconsistency. However, since in most of the cases 
technology is Type II it is, indeed, surprising that TT mergers have not been uncommon in the 
20
th Century. In other words, TT merger equilibrium is not superfluous. We now provide 
optimal secession and revision rules taking into account the problem of time inconsistency. 
Here it bears noting that time inconsistency problem is not faced in TTLM (TT) mergers 
because in such mergers final shares are based on post-technology transfer bargaining powers. 
So in the following propositions the problem of time inconsistency involves TT, TTLM, and 
TTLM (LM) mergers. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: Given complete information and Property 1 states desirous of forging a union 
under the shadow of contest commit to SR*, which is the unique sub-game perfect Secession 
Rule:   29
(1) Type I Technology and pre-technology transfer Type II Technology: SR*(g≤0 or t ∉ [t
min, 
t
max]) = (Exit, No War) and SR* (g>0 and t ∈ [t
min, t
max])  ∈ {(Continue, No War), (Exit, 
War)}. For Category I and II contests SR* is sub-game perfect iff  ( ) l l l F C g p − >   { } j i l , ∈ ∀  
and  () ( ) l l l l l x F C x g − − > − λ ρ   { } j i l , ∈ ∀ , respectively. 
(2) Post-technology transfer Type II Technology: T* is the time required for technology 
transfer 
(a)  T(i) = T(j) = T(i)∩T(j) = {TT}: SR* ( g,  t| * T ≥ Γ ) = {Exit, No War} and 
Proposition 3 (case 1) applies (dissolution followed by peaceful coexistence), 
(b) T(i)∩T(j) = {TT} and |T(i)| and/or |T(j)| ≥1: SR* (g, t| * T ≥ Γ ) = {Exit, No War} 
and Proposition 3 (case 3) applies (dissolution followed by contests), 
(c) |T(i)∩T(j)| ≥1 and INV =0: SR* (g, t|* T ≥ Γ ) = {Exit, No War} and Proposition 3 
(case 2) applies (dissolution followed by renegotiation), and 
(d) |T(i)∩T(j)|≥1 and INV =1: Case (1) above applies (constitutional accommodation). 
 
The secession rule is optimal in the sense that as long as union generates additional benefits 
from synergy none of the province secedes otherwise the rule allows for peaceful dissolution. 
By peaceful we mean that there is no contest related to existing merger arrangement. But this 
does not rule out later contests. Further even though in equilibrium there is no secession still if 
it so happens that one of the states has an infinitesimal tendency to stray from the equilibrium 
in some period then the other state would punish the deviant as long as conditions specified in 
Proposition 5 are satisfied for both states. If, however, the conditions are fulfilled only for one 
of the states, say j, then when state i secedes in contravention of secession rule then state i has 
to face contest immediately in the same period but not vice versa. But if neither of the 
provinces can fulfill the requirement to punish the other province in case the latter deviates 
from agreement then our constitution does not have the capacity to restrain defections. In 
other words technology of contest provides limited internal capacity to the constitution to 
check non-equilibrium secessionist behaviour, if any. Finally we state the optimal revision 
rule. 
 
PROPOSITION 6: Given complete information states desirous of forging a union under the 
shadow of contest commit to C2*, which is the unique sub-game perfect Revision Rule, where 
{} t SR CC Z i n , , , λ ∈  and  () ( ) ' ' Γ = Γ = Γ Z Z , where  = Γ 0, 1, 2, 3…. 
1)  {} () II I T C , *, * 2 ∈ < Γ γ  and  ( ) I T C = ≥ Γ γ *, * 2 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0 1 : Z Z Z = Γ Ψ = + Γ    30
2)  () II T C = ≥ Γ γ *, * 2 : 
a.  Proposition 5 (case 2a-2c):  ( ) φ = Γ Z . 
b.  Proposition 5 (case 2d):  ( ) ( ) ( )= Γ Ψ = + Γ Z Z 1   ( ) * T Z = Γ , where  () * T CC n ≥ Γ  
∈T(i)∩T(j) \{ () * T CC n < Γ }, which in turn determines rest of the articles through 
() * T ≥ Γ λ  following Proposition 3 (case 2). 
 
The important point about Proposition 5 and 6 is that irrespective of type of technology 
neither of them is time-inconsistent, which means that we are not using time-inconsistent 
revision and secession rules to resolve the time inconsistency of other articles. To summarize 
our findings so far note that whenever possible in equilibrium merger takes place in the initial 
period itself
24 without any contest under the time consistent contested constitution, C* = (C0* 
- Proposition 1 and 5, C1* - Proposition 3, C1a* - Proposition 3, C2* - Proposition 6, C3* - 
Proposition 3) and there is no secession in contravention to secession rule. 
 
One last point before we close this section. Despite complete information and threat of contest 
there are limits to what an advanced state can extract for transferring technology. In the next 
proposition we specify the upper limit in case of TT mergers. Results for other types of 
mergers involving technology transfer can be obtained similarly. 
 
PROPOSITION 7: The fraction of additional product generated due to technology transfer in a 
TT merger, which advanced state, say i, can extract through tax transfers is bounded from 
above by  () 1 0
max < ⋅ = Γ t i λ . 
 
4.0 Extensions and Qualifications 
 
4.1 Demographic heterogeneity 
 
We suggested above that demographic heterogeneity could play a role like nature or history in 
constraining the set of desirable mergers (see Footnote 18). Heterogeneity can be of different 
types, say, ethnic, economic, or both. Economic heterogeneity can result from unequal 
material and/or technological endowments. Another way of looking at heterogeneity is to 
                                                 
24 With some modifications to this section we can also construct equilibria which support delayed mergers.   31
differentiate between inter-state and intra-state heterogeneity. Figure 5 summarizes the entire 
range of possibilities in this regard. Type I (inter-state economic) heterogeneity has been 
addressed in the benchmark model in Section 3. In case of Type VI heterogeneity there is no 
incentive for merger so we will not discuss this case here. Note that in our discussion below 
we assume intra-group homogeneity, absence of cross-border collaboration between groups, 
and absence of possibility of contests. The last assumption restricts us to the negotiation 
model presented in Section 3.1.1 (supra).
25 In addition we make a very restrictive assumption 
regarding intra-state ethnic heterogeneity, namely, the same ethnic distribution applies to both 
states. 
Figure 5 about here 
 
4.1.1 Type II (intra-state and inter-state economic) heterogeneity 
 
Assume intra-state economic heterogeneity in the form of population divided into two classes, 
namely, labour and capital. In absence of resource mobility return to a factor in a state is 
inversely proportional to its availability in that state. The exact relationship is immaterial as 
long as it implies inverse proportionality so that owners of scarce resource earn scarcity rents. 
The identity of scarce resource is immaterial. All we need is scarcity of a resource and a group 
that can extract rents. Disproportionate division of the product captures the relative powers of 
the two groups and is also the source of conflict between them, which can be eliminated only 
when resource mobility is permitted. The group holding scarce input has a vested interest in 
maintaining the asymmetry. Consequently owners of scarce resource have a disproportionate 
power if every merger proposal has to be cleared by each group within a state before it is 
negotiated with other state. The game for choice of merger transforms into a nested or two-
level game with the first round being played within each state followed by another round 
between states in case of intra-state agreement in favour of inter-state merger negotiation. 
 
The key insights from the above model are as follows. Mergers involving resource mobility 
are never agreed to domestically as long as each economic interest group has a veto within a 
state. The veto of the group having excess resources is, in fact, redundant because in 
equilibrium it does not use its veto. The owners of scarce resource in a backward state would 
                                                 
25 Details of the extension are available from author. Here we will discuss the intuition behind the model and key 
insights.   32
support a full merger with technology transfer and resource mobility only if technology gap is 
sufficiently large. Otherwise this group would agree to technology transfer and limited 
resource mobility, i.e. an incomplete merger. In the limiting case it would veto any merger 
that includes more than technology transfer. In this latter case if there is an apprehension that 
the union might impose resource mobility in future even agreeing to merger involving only 
technology transfer becomes a dominated strategy for owners of scarce resources. In an 
advanced state the owners of scarce resource veto every type of merger proposal. In other 
words a merger which is Pareto optimal for the states as a whole might not be implemented 
once we introduce even minimal economic heterogeneity in the population of at least one 
state, with each interest group having a veto over choice of merger options. More importantly 
this result is irrespective of the identity of mobile resource. 
 
4.1.2 Type III (intra-state ethnic and inter-state economic) heterogeneity 
 
Type III heterogeneity is akin to Type I (inter-state economic heterogeneity) because in our 
model individuals within a state have equal labour and capital resources. So there is no 
economic dependence on co-citizens, including those belonging to other ethnic group. The 
issue of negative returns from working with ethnic others arises only when one has to 
collaborate with capital or labour resources of others. 
 
4.1.3 Type IV (inter-state ethnic and economic) heterogeneity 
 
Assume that states are ethnically different. For a while assume that only labour is mobile. In 
addition to earning returns to their respective unemployed factor inputs immigrant labour 
from labour surplus province and owners of excess capital in capital surplus province both 
suffer some disutility from engaging with ethnic strangers. For sufficiently large ethnic 
antipathy labour mobility becomes a dominated strategy for at least one of the states. It is in 
such cases that the identity of mobile resources matters in our model because states could 
bargain on a third dimension namely capital mobility (CM). Now TTLMCM is full merger 
while TTLM, TTCM, LMCM, LM, CM, and TT are partial mergers. Disagreement strategies 
now include CM, in addition to TT, LM, and NM. Since our analysis holds for the case   33
involving n-types of mergers and m(n) disagreement strategies we can very easily introduce 
capital mobility into the model without affecting the structure of the model. 
 
4.1.4 Type V (intra-state ethnic and economic and inter-state economic) heterogeneity 
 
Introducing (perfectly) correlated intra-state economic and ethnic heterogeneities (Type Va) 
does not lead to new outcomes because this case is structurally akin to Type II (intra-state 
economic) heterogeneity. Further the case involving uncorrelated intra-state economic and 
ethnic heterogeneities (Type Vb) can also be reduced to Type II heterogeneity if we recognize 
that without being tied to systematic economic differences ethnicity does not have any 




The first casualty in all cases above, in particular in Section 4.1.1 and 4.1.3 (supra), is labour 
mobility, which becomes less favoured once we introduce heterogeneity. With introduction of 
heterogeneity the model can support incomplete mergers contrary to Proposition 1 (see 
Footnote 10, supra). In case of inter-state ethnic heterogeneity capital mobility is never a 
dominated strategy even though labour mobility might be whereas in case of intra-state 
economic heterogeneity any kind of resource mobility could be dominated. To conclude in 
our model intra-state ethnic heterogeneity and inter-state economic heterogeneity are not 
restrictive while inter-state ethnic heterogeneity and intra-state economic heterogeneity can 
severely constrain the set of desirable mergers. Of the two the latter is more restrictive. Also 
note that unequal treatment of erstwhile foreign labour in a prospective union has non-trivial 
consequences in presence of ethnic heterogeneity. For instance, labourers from a labour 
surplus state could accept lesser wages, but more than their inside options, and become more 
acceptable in an ethnically different province. 
 
Possible extensions not yet implemented are as follows. One, interacting demographic 
heterogeneity with labour force and/or technology differentiated by skill levels; intuitively the 
key change because of this would be that unemployment rate would no longer provide an   34
upper limit to resource migration. Two, interacting divergent institutional preferences 
(unitary/federal, majoritarian/proportional, official language and religion, etc) with 
heterogeneity; here the problem is especially acute with time inconsistent mergers, where the 
prospective recipient of technology might accept certain repugnant institutions as a temporary 
expedient. In both the cases the set of mutually desirable mergers would be constrained. In 
fact, lexicographical preferences, with institutions being prior, can completely rule out 
merger. Three, replacing the veto with a policy contest between labour and capital within 
states. In this case the only difference is that with a positive probability the veto of owners of 
scarce resources is void, which yields two structurally independent cases corresponding to 
Section 3.0 and Section 4.1.1. Last but not the least are issues like possibility of cross-border 
class and/or ethnic collaboration and contests. 
 
4.2 Role of information 
 
Whenever nature does not reveal N (see Section 3.0, supra) fully to at least one of the states 
there is asymmetric information and consequently there would be incentives to misrepresent 
the same under certain conditions. States could potentially use private information to seek 
larger share in union. However, even if a state were to gain some advantage in this way the 
other state would figure out the discrepancy without much delay after formation of the union
26 
and seek revision through C2, C3, or outright contest. While misrepresenting private 
information to its advantage a state has to take into account such future setbacks. So the 
choice to misrepresent has to be dynamically consistent and efficient. Asymmetric 
information could lead to more contests after formation of unions in case of pooling 
equilibria. 
 
4.3 Role of Saving 
 
Introducing common saving rates across states does not affect relative bargaining power in 
negotiations and rate of success in contests over time. It, however, makes expensive contests 
affordable and necessitates inclusion of more categories of contest. Introducing more 
                                                 
26 This might not be possible always. Numerous instances of stalled or rigged census exercises across the globe 
are a case in point (Horowitz 2000 [1985]). Likewise it might not be feasible to carry out adequate survey of 
capital resources in troubled provinces of a union.   35
destructive or appropriate types of contest raises a number of questions. What if a backward 
state emerges winner in a contest and manages to capture some labour and capital of advanced 
state. Has the backward state managed to appropriate the advanced technology as well? Even 
if we were to ignore this savings might help a backward state to buy advanced technology 
through lump sum transfer. However, the amassed wealth can itself be targeted by the 
advanced state undercutting the backward state’s ability to follow such a course of action. 
Advanced state’s action would be governed by two motivations, namely, greed and fear. The 
former is obvious while the latter arises because if the advanced state does not save as much 
as backward state it might end up losing a future contest when the backward state would be 
able to organize more resources for contest. Possibly in equilibrium we would be back to the 
situation where both sides agree to a merger in initial period leading to payment through tax 
transfers rather than outright purchase at some future date. Unequal savings rates are though 
more problematic even under complete information because this new feature destabilizes the 
basic process of bargaining itself by changing relative bargaining power with time in a non-
trivial manner. 
 
4.4 Time inconsistency and permanent resource mobility 
 
Irreversible resource mobility changes the disagreement game. For this very reason a state that 
is going to lose bargaining power should not agree for permanent migration of its surplus 
resources. Consider two cases: (a) labour surplus backward state and (b) labour surplus 
advanced state. Recall that individuals own both labour and capital endowments. In the latter 
case moving to backward state with capital is not profitable. So surplus labour of an advanced 
state would relocate to the backward, labour deficient state while retaining capital in home 
state where productivity is higher and capital is scarce. In the former case, labour surplus 
backward state, migrants could profit from migrating along with their share in capital whereas 
in case of sufficiently high technology gap even migration sans capital is beneficial. In this 
case to rule out the possibility of permanent migration with or without capital it is sufficient 
(for the purpose of Section 3.0) to assume that states do not allow permanent transfer of 
capital resources and the technology gap between the two states falls below a certain threshold 
so that it does not make sense to migrate permanently leaving behind income from capital. 
However, further work is required to establish the conditions under which a state would agree 
to irreversible resource transfer.   36
 




This paper provides a model for optimal design of constitution for political union between 
unequally endowed states. We propose a constitution and then find the conditions under 
which negotiation equilibrium exists for a merger leading to a unitary state. We introduced a 
contested constitution to take into account the changes in negotiated solution under the threat 
of contest. The impact of contest is twofold. Firstly, it constrains the set of optimal taxes. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it increases the stability of constitution by making the 
punishment strategy in secession rule credible. The equilibrium in case of contested 
constitutional agreement is shown to be path dependent and, in some cases, time inconsistent. 
To address the latter issue we introduced a time consistent contested constitution. We also 
show that the rents extracted by the advanced state in the union for transferring technology to 
the backward state are increasing in complexity of technology and that there are limits to such 
rents. We then show that demographic heterogeneity constrains the set of mutually desirable 
mergers. Finally we draw attention to a few unresolved issues, e.g., impact of savings and 
permanent resource migration on inter-state mergers. 
 
5.2 Historical cycles of political geography 
 
In addition to the above our model supports the possibility of cycles in state size driven solely 
by technology and material endowments. In our model in certain cases unions dissolve after 
completion of technology transfer (see Proposition 5, supra). However, merger can take place 
again in future if technology levels diverge again. This logic applies to any permanently 
transferable resource. (Currently in our model certain kinds of technology are the only 
permanently transferable resources.) In other words historical cycles in state size, i.e. political 
geography, might be driven among other things by rate of diffusion of technology and other 
resources, including capital and labour. In our model discord is limited while diffusion is in 
progress and after that cooperation is limited. 
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5.3 Empirical evidence 
 
We will now look at the experience of a few post-1945 political unions in light of the above 
discussion. Table 3 lists a few examples discussed below. It bears noting that we are drawing 
attention to association between different types of merger in our model and these cases 
without denying the significance, or even primacy, of other factors, which might have 
governed the actual outcomes. 
Table 3 about here 
 
Case I: Let us begin with the ethnic minority, peripheral provinces of India and China, which 
in principle were united with the rest of the state on lines of a TT (technology transfer only) 
merger. The centre committed itself to uplifting the economic status of the region, i.e. 
transferring technology, while allowing these provinces to decide when they would like to 
extend the merger to include labour mobility. However, for all practical purposes secession is 
ruled out due to the overwhelming dominance enjoyed by the centre in these countries. But in 
both the countries the provinces merged under TT merger scheme have proved to be restive, 
which relates to the time inconsistency problems in such mergers pointed above. There have 
been two kinds of problems. One, in each of these cases the two sides disagree over the right 
to secede. The most well-known example of this is the 9
th point of the famous Naga-Akbar 
Hydari Accord (1947). 
Period of Agreement – The Governor of Assam as the Agent of the Government of the Indian Union 
will have a special responsibility for a period of 10 years to ensure the observance of the agreement, at 
the end of this period the Naga Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be 
extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of Naga people arrived at. 
 
The Naga National Council, a “separatist” underground outfit, interpreted this point as 
supportive of secession after 10 years while the Government of India read it as a provision for 
amending the Accord in light of experience. No wonder the accord was still born (See Kumar 
2005 for details of this case). Divergent evaluation of progress made due to merger has been 
another source of disagreement between the two sides in these cases. On the one hand the 
provincial leaders claim that the actual development falls far short of initial promises and/or 
that “outsiders” have appropriated the gains, if any. On the other the centre negates these 
claims but at the same time one can figure out that it is also concerned that rapid development 
would hand over more resources to “secessionists”. Post-Cold War India and China have   38
handled this latter problem in their own ways. Incidentally Indian provinces incorporated 
under TTLM (LM) and TTLM merger types of arrangements have not seen similar 
developments. 
 
Case II: Next consider the German re-unification. The re-unification was carried out under a 
TTLM (technology transfer and labour mobility) merger scheme, which according to our 
model implies lesser bargaining power for capital constrained, backward East Germany. It is 
indeed well-known that West Germany dominated the entire process of merger ranging from 
choice of constitution to fate of ailing industries of the East. In India Sikkim was merged 
under TTLM scheme and it is well known that it enjoys lesser bargaining power vis-à-vis 
Nagaland, etc, which were incorporated under TT merger. This disparity between Sikkim and 
Nagaland is in line with our model. 
 
Case III: The South Korean approach to re-unification rests on two assumptions. One, a 
gradual movement towards merger will help the North to catch up so that the cost of re-
unification to South Koreans is minimized. Two, as North Korea recovers economically it 
would be more confident about its ability to cope with life after re-unification. It would not be 
sacrilegious to label this approach as a step towards de facto TT merger. Our analysis suggests 
that in the process North Korea will improve its bargaining power, which seems to be the 
implicit policy of South Koreans, who think that a weak, and therefore paranoid, North Korea 
will be unpredictable. 
 
Case IV: Finally recall that our model suggests that the union is stable only if the province 
opposed to secession can credibly threaten to punish the potentially secessionist province. The 
most convincing empirical support for this comes from the erstwhile USSR. When Ukraine 
and the Baltic republics wanted to secede in the 1940s and 1950s the USSR survived due to 
Russian willingness to contest the demand for secession. But the USSR could not survive the 
Russian attempt to secede in the late 1980s. See, for instance, Hale (2005) in this regard who 
argues that a state cannot survive secessionist attempt by the core province(s), where the latter 
is the preponderant sub-state entity. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Proofs of results 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: It is advisable to go through this proof after reading Sections 2 and 3. 
(a)  [] 1 , 0 ∈ T θ  and  [] 1 , 0 ∈ L θ  denote, respectively, fraction of capital in backward province for 
which advanced technology is provided and fraction of unemployed labour force of labour 
surplus province permitted to work in labour deficient province. Pay-off to state i from n-type 
merger is given by the following expression, where 
n
l M  is economic product of state l under 
n-type merger and  {} j i l , ∈ : 
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We know that 
n
l l M SQ ≤   {} j i l , ∈ ∀  and  n ∀ , where  l SQ  is pay-off to state l from No Merger. 
We can substitute 
n
l l x SQ +  for 
n
l M , where  0 ≥
n
l x  is the additional economic product of state 
l in case of n-type merger and  0 >
n
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First consider an incomplete LM only merger (n = 1). Excess labour from one state works 
with excess capital of the other and the economic product is divided equally between the two. 
Thus, additional economic product accruing to each state when labour mobility is unlimited is 
given by 
1 1
j i x x = . When only  L θ  fraction of labour is allowed mobility then the additional 
economic product accruing to each state is given by 
1 1
j L i L x x θ θ = . The pay-off to state i and j 
in this case is given by the following, both strictly increasing in  L θ . 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t x x x t SQ SQ t SQ t U i L j L i L i j i i i i − + + + + + − = 1 1
1 1 1 1 θ θ θ λ λ  
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t x x x t SQ SQ t SQ t U j L j L i L j j i j j j − + + + + + − = 1 1
1 1 1 1 θ θ θ λ λ  
 
Now consider an incomplete TT only merger (n = 2). Let i be the advanced state. Since in this 
type of merger the advanced state i merely transfers technology there is no increase in its   40
economic product,  0
2 = i x , even though it benefits from tax based transfers. The pay-off to 
state i and j in this case is given by the following both of which are strictly increasing in  T θ . 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 1 j T i j i i i i x t SQ SQ t SQ t U θ λ λ + + + − =  
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t x x t SQ SQ t SQ t U j T j T j j i j j j − + + + + − = 1 1
2 2 2 θ θ λ λ  
 
Now it is easy to show that pay-off to state from multi-issue mergers is also strictly increasing 
in both  T θ  and  L θ . Note that we have not assumed any particular distribution of resources and 
the assumption of state i being advanced is without loss of generality. It remains to be pointed 
out that in absence of any other constraints, which is the case in our model so far (Sections 2 
and 3), both states irrespective of their technological and material endowments strictly prefer 
a complete merger ( 1 = T θ  and/or  1 = L θ ) to incomplete merger ( ∈ T θ  [0, 1) and/or  ∈ L θ [0, 
1))  n ∀ , which establishes the result.             QED 
 
(b) Let us assume the contrary to be true. If so then an incomplete merger of ni-type would be 
preferred to a complete merger of nj-type. However, if an incomplete merger of ni-type is 
preferred we know from the first part of this proposition that then a complete merger of ni-
type would be strictly preferred to both a complete merger of nj-type as well as an incomplete 
merger of ni-type. So the two states would conclude a merger agreement for a complete 
merger of ni-type rather than an incomplete merger of ni-type, which leads to the claim made 
in  the  proposition.          QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: (a) Suppose  i i λ β =  is not the equilibrium. Instead assume  i i λ β >
'  to be 
the equilibrium.  i j i j i i λ λ β β λ β − = < − = ⇒ > 1 1
' ' ' . However,  i λ  is by definition the seat 
sharing equilibrium and is therefore reflective of the relative bargaining power of the states. 
Cognizant of its real bargaining power State j  would renegotiate and achieve 
i j i j j λ β β λ β ≤ − = ⇒ ≥ 1 . Similarly, if  i i λ β <
'  then State i would renegotiate and achieve 
i i λ β ≥ . Combining the two we conclude that in equilibrium  i i λ β ≠
'  cannot be true. 
           QED 
 
(b) Suppose α  is not the equilibrium. Instead assume  ( ) j i λ λ α , min
' <  to be the equilibrium. 
Since the two states are unequally endowed  j i λ λ ≠ , so that  1 = ∑i i λ   ⇒ 5 . 0 ≠ i λ    41
⇒ ( ) 5 . 0 , min < j i λ λ . In this case 
' α is more relaxed than simple majority voting rule and 
violates the requirement of stability because partisans of both provinces can unilaterally 
amend the constitution. Next assume  ( ) ( ) [ ) j i j i λ λ λ λ α , max , , min
' ∈  to be the equilibrium. If 
this is true then immediately after merger State i with higher λ  can amend the constitution, 
including C1 where λ  is specified, to its advantage. This contradicts the fact that λ  is by 
definition equilibrium seat sharing rule. Here 
' α  violates the requirement of inclusiveness 
because a priori the weaker state would find it sub-optimal to join the union because it is 
completely defenceless against moves to reduce its seat and revenue share in union. The 
weaker state would therefore not join the union the moment α ′ is known to be the initial 
amendment rule. 
 
Thus the set of equilibrium amendment rules satisfying inclusiveness is given by 
( ) { } j i
Incl C λ λ α α , max | 3 ≥ = . Under such an amendment rule the stronger province of the 
union would need the support of at least one legislator from the weaker province to 
successfully implement an amendment advantageous to it. Any legislator from weaker 
province who votes for the amendment does so if and only if the change is beneficial for him. 
Since individuals in each state are identical (see Section 2.2) it ensures that such a change 
would be beneficial for all others in his province as well. Further, it is easy to see that only 
amendment rules that satisfy inclusiveness also satisfy the requirement of stability. So, C3
Incl 
= C3
Stable. To account for flexibility we choose the most liberal amendment rule. Thus in 
equilibrium constitutional amendment rule is given by C3* = min (C3
Incl  ∩ 
C3
Stable) ( ) j i λ λ , max = .         QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: SR depends on two factors: the stream of additional economic product 
generated by virtue of merger (CCn, C1 and C1a) and the ability of union to restructure via C2 
and C3 in face of crises. But we have shown in Lemma 1 that C1a and C3 are pegged to 
agreement on C1. Further revision rule C2 depends on C1 since the extent of revision required 
depends on the initial arrangement (C1, C1a, C3, SR, and CCn). Now it is easy to see that CCn 
and C1 are the only independent (sub-) articles, respectively, in Part I and II of constitution.
           QED 
   42
Proof of Lemma 5: The result is trivially true for | ) (n Si | = 1. For | ) (n Si | > 1 let V 
= } , { \ ) ( ' ˆ NM NM n Θ , i.e. there are |V| = | ) ( ' ˆ n Θ | -1 equilibria of disagreement game which are 
different from (NM, NM) and support some kind of partial merger. Key to establishing the 
equivalence is that pay-off in  ' Θ  corresponding to vth disagreement equilibrium is a weighted 
average of two quantities with one of them necessarily greater than the (NM, NM) pay-off 
while the other is greater than or equal to the latter depending on the strategy chosen. Recall 
that there is one tax rate across the unitary union, say, t. The equivalence suggested in the 
lemma follows if the following requirement is satisfied  { } j i l , ∈ ∀  and  v ∀ , where revenue 
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where  l SQ  is No Merger disagreement pay-off of state l and 
v
l M  is the economic product of 
state l under vth equilibrium of disagreement game,  ' Θ , where v ∈ {1, 2, … |V|}. We know 
that the following always holds, 
v
l l M SQ ≤   { } j i l , ∈ ∀  and  v ∀ . We can substitute for 
v
l M  
with 
v
l l x SQ + , where  0 ≥
v
l x  is the additional economic product of state l and 0 >
v
l x  for at 
least one l. The above condition can now be recast as follows: 
  () ( )
v




l l l x SQ x SQ t t x SQ SQ }\ , { }\ , { 1 ) ( + + + + − + < λ  
 







l x x t t x }\ , { 1 0 + + − < λ  
 
which is true for ∀ () 1 , 0 ∈ t , ∀l, and ∀v. Hence, all equilibria of normal form disagreement 
game  ) ( ' n Θ  lie along the diagonal. The justification for the substitution 
( ) l j i l l l SQ SQ SQ }\ , { + = λ , which is not immediately apparent, would bear some elaboration. 
The  vth equilibrium of disagreement game corresponds to either TT or LM merger. The 
substitution for  l λ  suggested is actually the corresponding  l λ  for TT or LM merger derived 
using Lemma 3. And here it is very important to note that we are not proceeding along a 
circular loop. For TT and LM mergers | ) (n Si | = 1 so the tax adjustment is trivial and tax 
adjusted game is identical, and not merely strategically equivalent, to the unadjusted game as 
indicated at the very beginning of this proof. So when we carry out the above substitution we   43
are not using unadjusted seat shares to show equivalence between adjusted and unadjusted 
disagreement games. 
 
To obtain  ' ' Θ  we need to add an infinitesimal quantity  ( ) 0 > ε  to the pay-off of State A 
corresponding to the equilibrium (TT, TT) in Θ  to preserve strict preferences in  ' Θ . (Without 
this addition we get an additional, but pay-off and also outcome equivalent, equilibrium.) 
With this adjustment it is easy to see that the strategic choices available to players in 
disagreement games  ' Θ  and  ' ' Θ  are identical and lead to identical equilibria.  QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 7: In case of unequal endowments  j i λ λ ≠ follows from Lemma 4. The total 
pay-off to state i from n-type merger is given by the following expression: 
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i d d d + = λ . 
n
i d  is the disagreement pay-
off. For such a state its contribution to union tax revenue is less than what it gets back and 
thus it prefers highest possible tax rate and likewise we can argue the other way round. 
           QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 : Recall that |Fl| < Cl, where l  ∈ { i, j }. Assume without loss of 
generality that  i i x g − λ > 0. Nature chooses a contest category for both the states. We will first 
determine the conditions under which certain CRT(s) dominate other CRTs for a state for a 
given type of merger. Using (15) - (18) it is easy to show that the following hold:
27 
 
a)  Status Quo is strictly dominated by Contest for state l for κ  = I and II if  ( ) l l l F C g p − >  
and  ( ) ( ) l l l l l F C x x g − > + − λ ρ , respectively. 
b)  Negotiate always dominates Status Quo. 
                                                 
27 Note that in each case possibility of contest increases with increase in size of potential surplus generated 
through cooperation or increase in probability of success of one of the states.   44
c)  Negotiate dominates Contest for state i, state j, and both if t(i) φ ≠ ,  t(i)  φ ≠ , and 
() ( ) j t i t ∩ φ ≠ , respectively. 
 
Type I contest: 
() { }
max & | t t t t t i t i i ≤ ≥ = , where  ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i x F C g p x g t − − − = − λ  
() { }
min & | t t t t t j t j j ≥ ≤ = , where  ( ) ( ) i j j i i i j x F C g p x g t − − + = − λ  
 
Type II contest: 
() { }
max & | t t t t t i t i i ≤ ≥ = , where  ( ) ( ) i i i i i x g F C t − − − = λ ρ  
() { }
min & | t t t t t j t j j ≥ ≤ = , where  ( ) ( ) i i j j j x g F C t − − + = λ ρ  
 
Now we proceed in two steps. (1) First we establish that  ( ) ( ) j t i t ∩ φ =  is impossible for 
Category II contests. (2) Then we show that for Category I contests t(i)  φ ≠  and t(j)  φ ≠  
cannot be simultaneously true. 
 








































ρ . Given that 
[ ]
max min,t t ∈ ρ  is always true none of the above hold. Therefore contest is always dominated 
by negotiate for both states for Category II contests. 
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. Now assume that contest dominates negotiate for state i, which 
implies the following  ( ) ( ) i i i i i i x F C g p x g t − − − < − λ . Contrary to our assertion further 
assume that the same is true about the state j as well. This implies 
( ) ( ) j j j j j j x F C g p x g t − − − < − λ . Combining the two we obtain  ( ) ∑ − >
i i i F C 0 , which 
cannot be true. This implies that contest cannot dominate negotiate for both states   45
simultaneously. Further it is easy to see that a) does not hold under any condition and 
combining b) and c) results in an impossibility (
max t <
min t ), which leads to the claim that for 
this category of contests contest dominates negotiate at most for one of the sides. 
           QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 1) This case is straightforward. Here according to nature’s draw 
neither is interested in any kind of merger. 
 
2) First note that by virtue of Proposition 2 we do not have a case where Negotiate  is 
dominated by Contest for both states. 
 
a) We are in regime N since neither state’s outside option is more attractive than their 
respective inside options. It is as if contests are unknown. Equilibrium seat sharing rule  i λ  is 
given by Lemma 6 while tax rate is determined using  i λ subject to  ( ) ( ) j t i t ∩ φ ≠  (see proof of 
Proposition 2, supra). 
 
b) In this case outside option of one state (here i) dominates the strategic interaction so that 
the other state (here j) makes an offer so as to make the former indifferent between contested 
and negotiated solutions or accepts a corresponding offer. Now by virtue of Property 1 (b) 




j j j E n m d , λ  for Category I ( I = κ ) contests as long as  ( ) i i i F C g p g − − > , which 
always holds, implying that state j is better off accepting  () ( ) I n m i j = Θ − = κ λ λ , ' | 1  in case 
negotiate dominates contest only for state j. 
 
3) State with |T(l)| ≠ 0 will precipitate contest every period because the other state is unwilling 
to consider any type of merger. Given that first strike advantage is non-zero contest is never 
strictly dominated. So the other state would at least try to avoid loss due to defensive contest 
strategy and will resist every period.              QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: After technology transfer is complete disagreement game changes in 
favour of erstwhile backward state, say j, which implies  ( )( ) * * T T j j < Γ > ≥ Γ η η . Assume 
that contrary to the claim in the proposition equilibria described in Proposition 3 are also time   46
consistent for Type II technology. If true this implies that erstwhile backward state chooses 
not to seek revision of sharing rules. In other words it prefers to continue with the existing 
arrangement despite the fact that its winning probabilities and bargaining power have 
increased. But the pay-off function (see Eqn 10) is strictly increasing in shares in legislature 
seats and revenue, and therefore the economic product, accruing to a state, which brings us to 
a contradiction. Therefore, after completion of technology transfer the initial agreement has to 
be revised. If not the challenger withdraws from the union and in a fresh round of merger 
negotiation/contest it emerges better-off. Hence the claim in the proposition that constitution 
for mergers not involving technology transfers at all or involving Type I technology are 
trivially  time-consistent.         QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: (1) With Type I technology post-merger gains from merger, g, are 
never zero so if a merger agreement takes place it remains in place till perpetuity. It is easy to 
verify that agreements characterized by Proposition 3 are self-enforcing since neither state has 
an incentive to withdraw from the union. From Proposition 4 we know that with Type II 
technologies equilibria described in Proposition 3 are not sub-game perfect because the 
underlying disagreement game changes starting from  * ' T T + = Γ , where  ' T  is the period in 
which merger agreement is arrived at (= 0 in our case), which will be addressed later. 
 
Assume 0 > − i i x g λ , i.e. i is the net recipient of transfers, without loss of generality. There 
are only two possibilities. One,  0 > + = j i x x g  and  0 > l x   { } j i l , ∈ ∀ . Province j  retains 
() 0 > − − i i j x g t x λ  of the additional product generated within its domain even after tax based 
transfers to the other province. So as long as g > 0 neither i nor j has any incentive to leave the 
union. Two,  0 > = j x g  and  0 = i x . Share of province i in additional product generated is 
0 > j ix tλ  while province j retains  ( ) 0 > − = − + j i j j j j j x t x x x t x λ λ . Once again, as long as g 
> 0, neither has any incentive to leave the union. If tax rate falls within the specified range the 
union is viable. So whenever SR does not permit secession none of the states has an incentive 
to secede. 
 
In case of deviation by province, say, i, we need to check if the punishment strategy 
prescribed in SR is optimal. Province j would contest an attempt to secede by province i iff 
the cost of contest is sufficiently low. Parallel requirement emerges for province i as well.   47
Finally, note that as long as the cost of contest is positive whenever g  ≤ 0 contest is a 
dominated strategy. The result stated in the proposition now follows.
 28     QED 
 
(2) With Type II technologies for  [ ] * , 1 T ∈ Γ  the above applies. Otherwise if union cannot 
reinvent itself and/or we have g = 0 dissolution is optimal and players are free to engage in 
accordance with Proposition 3. (a) Potential g  = 0 so after dissolution contest is strictly 
dominated strategy and peaceful co-existence as sovereign states is optimal under Proposition 
3 (case 1). (b) Potential g > 0 for at least one state and the sets of desirable mergers for the 
states are mutually exclusive so at least one state will contest after dissolution and the other 
has to respond as defending or not contesting is a strictly dominated strategy due to non-zero 
first strike advantage. So in this case dissolution is followed by contests as per Proposition 3 
(case 3). Success in contest is determined by Eqn (11). (c) Union is dissolved due to 
inflexibility of initial agreement (INV = 0). But potential g > 0 for both states and the post-
dissolution sets of desirable mergers are not mutually exclusive. So renegotiation takes place 
as per Proposition 3 (case 2). (d) Initial agreement is flexible (INV=1). Potential g > 0 for 
both states and the post-technology transfer sets of desirable mergers are not mutually 
exclusive so constitutional accommodation is possible through revision of the initial 
agreement. Fresh shares are determined as per Proposition 3 (case 2), and any deviation is 
punished as per secession rule (Case 1 above).          QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: The intuition is simple. Even after technological convergence states 
need each other to harness excess factor inputs so that rational players in complete 
information set up would avoid loss of benefits from cooperation and instantly adjust the 
agreement  as and when relative bargaining power changes. (1) Following Proposition 4 
agreement is time-consistent for the cases  { } ( ) II I T , *, ∈ < Γ γ  and ( ) I T = ≥ Γ γ *, , which 
implies that the optimal revision rule specified is unique sub-game perfect revision rule 
because  0
0 > Γ ∀ =
= Γ Γ
j j η η . (2) Regarding the other case ( ) II T = ≥ Γ γ *,  first note that it is 
easy to see that in case union is dissolved the specified revision rule is the unique sub-game 
perfect rule. Otherwise merger type is revised to  ∈
≥ Γ * T
n CC   ( ) ( ) ( )
* \
T
n CC j T i T
< Γ ∩  and Part 
(1) of this proposition applies thereafter.             QED 
 
                                                 
28 It can be shown that in our framework if g = 0 for whatever reasons, exogenous or endogenous, then a merger 
cannot be salvaged through federalization of the state.   48
Proof of Proposition 7: The advanced state, say i, can at most reap 
() ( ) ()() ∑
= Γ
= Γ





i j i j j t X X L K λ μ  for transferring technology to the backward state 
under TT merger, where μ  is the discount factor. Following Propositions 3 - 6 we can say 
that max  () ≤ Γ t  t
max and  () ( ) 0 = Γ = Γ i i λ λ  for  [ ] * , 0 T ∈ Γ . So  0 * > ∂ Π ∂ T , that is the more 
complex a technology (larger T*) higher the technology rents accruing to the advanced state. 
T* ∞ →  relates to the most complex technology. The upper limit specified in the proposition 



















* , min lim
T
j i j j T X X L K μ .       QED 
 
Appendix II: Description of Disagreement Game (Fig 1) 
 
Assume that the initial distribution of capital and labour is such that production in State A is 
capital constrained whereas the production in State B is labour constrained.
  In a labour 
constrained State B by definition  B B L K > . Given that  1 = + B A K K  and  1 = + B A L L  hold this 
implies  A A L K < . Further assume A > B, which implies technological preponderance of State 
A. So we are dealing with an advanced capital constrained State A facing a backward labour 
constrained State B. Recall our production function  ( ) i i i K L X , min , where  {} B A X i , ∈ , and 
that we divide economic product equally between labour and capital inputs and also that 
migrant labour is not discriminated against. 
 
In case states adopt different disagreement strategies or both adopt No Merger (NM) as their 
disagreement strategy they obtain their respective No Merger/status quo pay-offs. Under No 
Merger State A’s pay-off is  A AK :  A AK 5 . 0  from use of its capital and another  A AK 5 . 0  from 
commensurate use of its labour because it is capital constrained. Likewise State B’s pay-off is 
B BL :  B BL 5 . 0  from use of its labour and another  B BL 5 . 0  from commensurate use of its 
capital because it is labour constrained. 
 
If labour mobility (LM) is the disagreement strategy of both states then State A gets additional 
income,  () A A K L B − 5 . 0 , due to employment of previously unemployed share of its population 
whereas State B gets additional income due to utilization of its excess capital. Pay-offs to   49
State A and B are  () A A A K L B AK − + 5 . 0  and  ( ) B B L K B + 5 . 0 , respectively. If technology 
transfer (TT) is the disagreement strategy of both states then State B obtains additional 
income,  () B L B A− , due to improved productivity. State A receives only its No Merger pay-
off,  A AK , as its unemployed labour is not permitted to work in State B state. The 
corresponding pay-off for State B is  B AL . 
 
Finally, if agreement is reached upon both technology transfer and labour mobility, i.e. a 
TTLM merger is agreed upon, then State B obtains additional income due to improved 
productivity and full utilization of its capital within its state whereas State A gets additional 
income due to full utilization of its labour force. Pay-offs to State A and B are  () A A K L A + 5 . 0  
and  () B B K L A + 5 . 0 , respectively. To obtain disagreement games for one issue one step 
mergers (e.g., TT merger and LM merger) ignore the strategies TT and LM in Fig 1, which 
leaves behind a 1x1 matrix where both players have only one strategy, namely, NM.   50
Tables 
 






State A  State B 
I: Resource constraint, unequal technology  KA≠ LA  KB≠ LB  A/B≠ 1 
II: Resource sufficiency, unequal technology  KA=LA  KB=LB  A/B≠ 1 
III: Resource constraint, identical technology  KA≠ LA  KB≠ LB  A/B = 1 
IV: Resource sufficiency, identical technology  KA=LA  KB=LB  A/B = 1 
 
 
Table 2: Numerical Example (Capital Constrained State A vs. Labour Constrained State B) 
Technology: A = 2B = 2, Resources: KA = 0.70, KB = 0.30, LA = 0.80, LB = 0.20 
 
Type of Merger 
 
Share of State B 
in union  
legislature 
in overall economic  
product of union 
Partial mergers  One issue-one step  
Technology Transfer, TT  0.125  0.222 
Labour Mobility, LM  0.125  0.147 
Full mergers  One issue-multi step 
Technology Transfer and Labour Mobility 
(disagreement strategy, no merger), TTLM-NM 
0.125 0.250 
Technology Transfer and Labour Mobility 
(disagreement strategy, LM merger), TTLM-LM 
0.147 0.250 
Technology Transfer and Labour Mobility 
(disagreement strategy, TT merger), TTLM-TT 
0.222 0.250 
Full mergers  Multi issue-multi step  
Technology Transfer after Labour Mobility, 
TTLM(LM) 0.147  0.250 
Technology Transfer followed by Labour Mobility,
TTLM(TT) 0.222  0.250 
                                                 
29 Example discussed at length in Appendix II belongs to Case I. All other cases are special cases of Case I.   51
Table 3: Historical Cases of Political Union 
 
Type of Merger  Historical example(s) 
TT  Princely states and tribal areas in North West and North East India (late 
1940s), Western peripheral provinces (Tibet and Xinjiang) of China (late 
1940s) 
LM  North and South Yemen (1990) 
TTLM (LM)  Princely states in mainland India (late 1940s) 
TTLM (TT)  Korean approach to merger (1990 onwards) 
TTLM  East and West Germany (1990), Sikkim and India (1975) 
 Figures 
 























Labour Mobility  () 1 , 0 ∈ L θ   Partial, 
incomplete 
NA  Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete 
Technology Transfer  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ T θ   NA 
Partial, 
incomplete 
Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete 
Labour Mobility and Technology 
Transfer  () 1 , 0 , ∈ T L θ θ   NA  NA  Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete 
Complete 
Labour Mobility  1 = L θ   Partial, complete  NA  Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete 
Technology Transfer  1 = T θ   NA 
Partial, 
complete 
Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete  Full, incomplete 
Labour Mobility and Technology 
Transfer  1 , = T L θ θ   NA  NA  Full, complete  Full, complete  Full, complete 
 
Resources covered under merger 
agreement 
Extent of resource sharing   53
Figure 2: Disagreement Game, Θ  
 
   State  B 
   LM  TT  NM 
State A 
LM  ( ) ( ) ( ) B B A A A L K B K L B AK + − + 5 . 0 , 5 . 0
30  ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A BL AK ,  
TT  ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A AL AK ,   ( ) B A BL AK ,  
NM  ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A BL AK ,  
 
                                                 
30 In Figure 2 - 4 the underlined entries are pure strategy Nash equilibria.   54
Figure 3: Tax Adjusted Disagreement Game,  ' Θ  
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  ( ) B A BL AK ,  
NM  ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A BL AK ,  
 








A BL AK t BL t BL t AK t AK , 1 , 1 = + − + −    55
Figure 4: Reduced Form Disagreement Game,  ' ' Θ  
 
   State  B 
   LM  TT  NM 
State A 
LM  ( ) ( ) ( ) B B A A A L K B K L B AK + − + 5 . 0 , 5 . 0   ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A BL AK ,  
TT  ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A AL AK , ε +   ( ) B A BL AK ,  
NM  ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A BL AK ,   ( ) B A BL AK ,  
 
ε > 0 
 
   56
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